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Abstract: This paper examines variations in residents’ responses to proposals to 
redevelop three public housing neighbourhoods in Dublin using Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) and the outcomes their resistance achieved. In two of these 
neighbourhoods community representative structures were strong and although one 
community co-operated with the PPP plans and the other opposed them, both were 
broadly successful in achieving their campaign objectives.  Community structures in the 
third case-study area were weak however and the imposition of PPP redevelopment 
devastated this neighbourhood which is now almost entirely vacant.  This case study is 
employed to critique the literature on grassroots resistance to urban redevelopment 
and welfare state restructuring and social housing development policy in Ireland.  The 
paper concludes that, contrary to many researchers’ assumptions, residents’ political 
action and resistance can significantly influence on public housing redevelopment 
strategies despite the dominance of neoliberal and entrepreneurial governance regimes.  
However, for vulnerable communities were representative structures are weak, the 
over-emphasis on gentrification/ social mixing and refurbishing the built environment 
in Irish public housing development policy can have devastating consequences.  Indeed, 
demolition and rebuilding programmes in particular can destabilise target 
neighbourhoods to the extent that the residents who ultimately enjoy the benefits of 
public housing redevelopment are largely or entirely different from those who 
campaigned for its instigation. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper examines plans to redevelop run down public housing neighbourhoods in 
Dublin in conjunction with private developers which were initiated and partially 
implemented during Ireland’s ‘celtic tiger’ economic boom in the early 2000s but 
collapsed at the end of the decade when this country experienced one of the most 
severe busts of the global financial crisis (Norris and Coates, 2014).  It focuses on the 
experiences of the residents of three case-study neighbourhoods responding to public–
private partnership (PPPs) redevelopment programmes.  The neighbourhoods share a 
common socio-economic profile (very disadvantaged), location (in Dublin’s inner-city), 
design (low-rise apartment blocks built in the 1950s and 1960s) and landlord (the 
municipal government – Dublin City Council).  However, they differ significantly in 
terms of the strength of community structures, their views on the PPP plans, the 
campaign strategies they adopted in response and outcomes experienced. 
 
On the basis of these case studies the paper firstly examines the politics and 
effectiveness of different community responses to public housing redevelopment 
programmes (outright resistance, unequal co-operation and co-operation on more 
equal terms with the state and business interests) in different contexts (deeply 
embedded and resilient community structures in two neighbourhoods much weaker 
structures in the third).  In addition, these cases are employed to critique the treatment 
of grass roots resistance to public housing redevelopment, housing privatisation and 
poverty deconcentration policies in the urban studies literature and key features of 
public housing redevelopment policy in Ireland, namely its strong emphasis on partial 
privatisation and gentrification/social mixing and on refurbishing the built environment 
rather than establishing social programmes. The emergence of community resistance 
emerged as a response to this state policy which placed little value on sustaining these 
disadvantaged communities is also explored. The analysis of these issues presented 
here is organised into seven further sections.  The first and second of these of these 
summarise the relevant themes in the literature and features of the case-study 
neighbourhoods and research methods employed to examine them.  The next three 
examine: the process of devising and implementing redevelopment plans for the three 
neighbourhoods; policy makers’ rationales for choosing these strategies, residents’ 
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responses and outcomes achieved.  The conclusions set out the findings of the case-
study research and reflect on their implications for the literature on residents’ 
resistance to public housing redevelopment and for neighbourhood regeneration policy 
in Ireland. 
 
Grassroots Resistance, Privatisation and Poverty Deconcentration 
 
The cases examined here are relevant to some of the oldest themes in the urban studies 
literature and some of the newest.  Of most direct relevance is the large literature on 
grassroots resistance to urban redevelopment which emerged during the 1970s and 
1980s among which Manuel Castells’ (1983) landmark study The City and the Grassroots 
was particularly influential.  His analysis emphasised the agency and the impact of 
grassroots movements, while also acknowledging their limits.  Although unable to 
transform social structures, he argued that these movements have the potential to 
transform ‘urban meanings’, by undermining the social hierarchies which structure 
urban life and working to create cities organised on the basis of autonomous local 
cultures and decentralized participatory democracy. However, later research in this 
genre placed less emphasis on the agency of urban grass roots movements and more on 
their limits, for instance of their local focus, which prevents them from challenging the 
wider social structures which shape their problems and on the co-option of these 
movements by state and other powerful interests (e.g. Mollenkopf, 1983; Kramer, 
1981). 
 
This use of PPPs to redevelop public housing is also relevant to the extensive literature 
on neo-liberalism and welfare state privatisation, particularly privatisation of the 
government owned social housing sector (called public or council housing) which is 
concentrated in English speaking countries.  Writers on public housing privatisation do 
discuss resistance but they concentrate on conflict between (different layers of) 
government and political parties rather than resistance by the occupants of these 
dwellings (e.g. Malpass, 2005). 
 
Also of relevance to the cases examined here is the fashion for efforts to ‘deconcentrate’ 
poor households.  Governments in many developed countries, including Ireland have 
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tried to achieve this by subsidizing low income residents to move to wealthier 
neighbourhoods (‘person centred’ measures such as Moving to Opportunity in the USA) 
or ‘demolishing existing public housing and replacing it with mixed tenure housing 
(‘property centred measures’ such as the US HOPE IV scheme and the PPP schemes 
under examination here).  Reflecting the studies of the negative ‘neighbourhood effects’ 
of poverty concentrations which (in part at least) inspired these policies, many 
evaluations of their effectiveness uncritically assume that deconcentrating poverty will 
deliver neighbourhood sustainability.  What is lost in terms of public housing units, 
community history and networks and bonds between neighbourhoods has received less 
attention (Popkin, 2006 is an exception).  The US research on the politics of 
neighbourhood deconcentration has also concentrated on opposition from middle class 
communities to disadvantaged incomers and largely neglected resistance from already 
resident poor households (Glaster, et al, 2003).  However, recent, mainly British, 
research on ‘state-led’ urban gentrification has adopted a more critical perspective 
(Hackwood and Smith, 2001).  In this vein, Watt (2009) highlights the working class 
displacement commonly generated by gentrification, the role public housing has often 
played as a buffer against this process and the contribution of redevelopment focussed 
on tenure mixing to undermine this role.  
 
Cases and Methods 
 
The three neighbourhoods examined here - Fatima Mansions, Dolphin House and 
O’Devaney Gardens are all located in Dublin’s inner-city, one to three miles from the 
main downtown shopping and business district.  Fatima Mansions and Dolphin House 
are on adjacent sites, in the south inner-city, whereas O’Devaney Gardens is in the north 
inner-city.  The neighbourhood’s characteristics are summarised in Table 1 which 
explains that all were built between 1949 and 1956 as part of a slum clearance drive 
and, reflecting architectural fashions and the methods of social housing provision 
common at the time, all are low-rise apartment complexes (called flats in Ireland), 
owned and managed directly by the municipal government (Dublin City Council).  Each 
neighbourhood is small (originally between 278 and 436 dwellings) and largely mono-
ethnic (white, Irish) but the districts surrounding them contain a mix of housing 
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tenures, commercial and residential development and (particularly in recent years) 
income and ethnic groups. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Case-study Estates 
 Dolphin House Fatima Mansions O’Devaney Gardens 
Year of 
construction 
1956 1949 1956 
Location Rialto district in 
Dublin’s south inner-
city 
Rialto district in 
Dublin’s south inner-
city 
Stoneybatter district 
in Dublin’s North 
Inner-city. 
Original Design Six apartment blocks, all 
four storeys high and 
two storey blocks for 
older people 
Four storey 
apartment blocks.   
13 apartment blocks 
all four storeys high. 
Current Design Same as above. Mix of four storey 
apartments, terraced 
houses and 
maisonettes and also 
retail, offices and a 
sports and 
community centre. 
All except four 
apartment blocks 
have been 
demolished and most 
of the site is currently 
a vacant lot. 
Number and 
tenure of 
dwellings 
originally 
provided 
392 family sized 
dwellings and 44 units 
for older people, all 
public rented 
394 dwellings all 
public rented 
278 dwellings all 
public rented. 
Number and 
tenure of 
dwellings 
currently 
provided 
Same as above. Rebuilt in 2007 to 
include 180 public 
rented dwellings, 70 
‘affordable’ dwellings 
for sale at below 
market value and 396 
private dwellings for 
sale on the open 
market. 
Most dwellings are 
empty only 44 
residents currently 
remain in situ, but 
will soon be rehoused 
elsewhere 
 
During the decades following their construction the case-study neighbourhoods enjoyed 
a period of stability.  This ended in the 1970s when deindustrialisation and economic 
stagnation precipitated a dramatic increase in unemployment, particularly in inner 
cities.  These neighbourhoods were further destabilised by heroin use and associated 
drugs markets which emerged in Dublin in the early 1980s, by poor quality housing 
management and maintenance by Dublin City Council and the fact that, unlike residents 
of public rented houses, residents of flats were not eligible to purchase their home (at a 
substantial discount from market value) which encouraged some to move to houses to 
avail of this opportunity. 
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In response to these problems government began to fund community development and 
establish other spatially targeted social programmes from the early 1980s and also set 
up a separate ‘Remedial Works Scheme’ which funded the physical development of 
public housing estates.  The former programmes had a positive impact on Fatima 
Mansions and Dolphin House in particular (see: Punch, 2009), but research conducted 
by the authors in 1997-98 found that the Remedial Works Scheme funded 
redevelopment of Fatima Mansions in the late 1980s was less successful: 
 
Residents now widely assert that the refurbishment was a complete 
failure and a waste of money.  [Dublin City Council] officials tacitly 
agree…Within a few years of the refurbishment, some of the blocks had a 
more derelict appearance than they had before the refurbishment took 
place (Norris, 1999: 117-118). 
 
This research links the failure of this redevelopment to the lack of consultation with 
residents regarding its design and the lack of integration between social investment and 
the physical redevelopment programme.   
 
Despite the continuing problems of the case-study neighbourhoods however, the 
districts surrounding them gentrified significantly during Ireland’s economic boom of 
the 1990s and early 2000s, reversing a two century long pattern of population decline 
and residualisation.  According to Hasse (2009) inner-city Dublin saw the largest fall in 
deprivation of any Irish region between 1991 and 2006. 
 
The analysis of these redevelopment programmes which is presented in this paper 
draws on four separate studies of these neighbourhoods conducted by the authors in 
1997-98, 2004-07, 2007-09 and 2012-13, the results of which are set out in three books 
(Fahey (ed), 1999; Hearne, 2011, Norris (ed) 2013) and numerous articles.  Each study 
was operationalised using a mixed methods approach which employed: documentary 
analysis (of policy statements and redevelopment plans); statistical analysis (of socio-
economic, housing and public spending survey and administrative data); observation of 
relevant committee and public meetings and in-depth group and individual interviews 
with residents, landlord’s representatives and social service providers (80 respondents 
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were interviewed in all).  These studies have yielded a particularly strong evidence base 
on Fatima Mansions which was included in all four rounds of research.  Dolphin House 
and O’Devaney Gardens were included in the studies conducted in 2007-09 and 2012-
13.  Thus less data are available on the long term trajectories of these neighbourhoods 
but the PPP scheme proposed to redevelop them was studied in significant depth. 
 
Redevelopment Planning and Implementation 
 
Fatima Mansions 
Residents of Fatima Mansions commenced lobbying for a full redevelopment of their 
neighbourhood in the mid-1980s and this campaign intensified in the 1990s following 
the failure of the Remedial Works Scheme project.  This second phase of agitation was 
organised by Fatima Groups United (FGU) which was established in 1995 to co-ordinate 
the numerous community and social service organisations which were established here 
during the preceding decade.   
 
Following inconclusive redevelopment negotiations with Dublin City Council in the late 
1990s, FGU developed an alternative redevelopment plan - Eleven Acres, Ten Steps – that 
emphasised the need for an holistic social, economic and physical redevelopment 
programme; devised in consultation with residents and overseen by an independent 
management board made up of representatives of the landlord, other relevant agencies 
and residents (Fatima Groups United, 2000).  Dublin City Council responded with its 
own plan which incorporated many of FGU’s ideas but placed more emphasis on 
physical refurbishment and less on social interventions (Dublin City Council, 2002).  
Further negotiations between the Council and residents in 2001, resulted in a 
compromise plan which provided for: demolition of the flats and their replacement by 
public housing; dwellings for sale at below market value to low income households 
(called affordable housing in Ireland), commercial and community facilities, funding for 
a social regeneration plan and the establishment of an independent redevelopment 
management board.   
 
In recent decades almost all grant aid for social house building and redevelopment in 
Ireland has come from central government.  Throughout 2002, Dublin City Council 
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negotiated with the housing ministry to secure funding for Fatima Mansions but in early 
2003 the Council began to explore using a Public Private Partnership (PPP) instead.  
Following negotiations with residents in 2003 tenders were invited from private 
developers interested in participating in the PPP.  Later that year the Council agreed 
that the successful bidder would demolish the existing neighbourhood and replace it 
with 150 public housing and 70 affordable housing units, a community and sports 
centre and small business units (all owned by Dublin City Council) and provide a €6.5 
million grant for social regeneration projects (see: Whyte, 2005).  In return the 
developer could construct 396 private dwellings on the site for sale on the open market.  
The development process started soon after and the public housing was partially 
demolished and replacement public housing completed in 2004.  The private 
apartments and commercial, community and sports facilities were built in 2005-06 and 
implementation of the social regeneration plan was completed in 2010. 
 
O’Devaney Gardens 
O’Devaney Gardens’ residents started lobbying for improvements to their 
neighbourhood in the late 1990s when an ad hoc group came together for this purpose.  
This campaign focused on provision of better community facilities, because social 
problems were less serious here than in Fatima Mansions and residents felt that 
combatting them did not require redevelopment. 
 
However, Dublin City Council revealed plans for a PPP redevelopment to surprised 
residents’ representatives in 2003.  In response, residents established representative 
structures to try lobby to influence the plans.  Work on implementing the PPP moved 
quickly.  Expressions of interest from private developers were sought for this 
redevelopment and four other areas and in 2006 a consortium of two large Irish 
property development companies was identified as the preferred bidder for all five PPP 
schemes.  Contracts were signed in 2007.  Following negotiations with O’Devaney 
residents the Council agreed that the rebuilt neighbourhood would maintain the public 
housing at 2008 levels (280 dwellings).  In addition, the redevelopment plan provided 
for 250 affordable and 287 private dwellings, together with community and commercial 
facilities. 
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These plans were never implemented because in summer 2008, following Ireland’s 
economic and property market collapse, the developer withdrew citing the PPP’s lack of 
economic viability (he subsequently filed for bankruptcy).  In August of that year Dublin 
City Council appointed a team to work with residents on revised redevelopment plans, 
but no plans were finalised.  In 2013 the Council announced that the redevelopment 
plans were being abandoned and the remaining residents of O'Devaney Gardens would 
be relocated elsewhere. 
 
Dolphin House 
Dolphin House residents lobbied the Council in the early 2000s for an upgrading of their 
defective sewage system, damp proofing their flats and to address issues of anti-social 
behaviour.  Dublin City Council insisted that the only way forward was to demolish and 
rebuild the estate using a PPP.  The Dolphin House residents’ representatives opposed 
this and sought alternative potential redevelopment models (Hearne, 2011).  Despite 
community opposition the Council commissioned a PPP feasibility study in 2006 which 
proposed the demolition and replacement of all 436 existing public housing units, but 
that commercial development 600 private dwellings should also be built on the site 
(MCO Projects, 2007).   
 
Concerned by their minimal input into the feasibility plan and lack of resources for 
community support staff and expert advice to enable their informed input the residents’ 
association began to mobilise more effective opposition.  They halted negotiations, 
refused to allow any decanting of residents, and pressured Dublin City Council to 
provide grant aid to enable the appointment of independent architects and other 
professionals to work with residents to develop an alternative community-based model 
of redevelopment and then facilitate the entire community to vote on which model they 
wanted – that proposed in the PPP feasibility study or the alternative.  This lobbying 
was successful.  In 2008 a development board was established, the residents secured 
finance from the Council to hire planning and architectural advisors and commenced a 
further process of consultation with residents on the various development proposals.  
The resultant report Dolphin Decides revealed that most residents supported the 
demolition and rebuilding plans and the introduction of private housing, but only a 
small majority supported the PPP implementation model and a large majority opposed 
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any reduction in public housing numbers and high-rise development (Dolphin House 
Community Development Association, 2008). 
 
However, following the collapse of PPP schemes in O’Devaney Gardens and four other 
neighbourhoods in 2008, Dublin City Council decided that a PPP was no longer feasible 
for the Dolphin House redevelopment and, in the context of the concurrent economic 
crisis, neither was a traditional publicly funded redevelopment.  In response residents 
stepped up the intensity and focus of their resistance.  They adopted a ‘human rights 
approach’ which involved collecting evidence on the negative health implications of 
poor living conditions there and holding a series of public ‘hearings’ with the Irish 
Government’s Human Rights Commission and other international human rights experts 
to give evidence that these conditions breached residents’ human rights (Hearne and 
Kenna, 2014).  This agitation has reaped benefits.  In 2010, the Dolphin House residents 
and the Council commenced negotiations on a new redevelopment plan which would be 
implemented using public funding rather than a PPP.  Central government announced in 
2013 that the requisite finance would be provided. 
 
Redevelopment Rationales 
 
The general reasons why policy makers in Ireland adopted the PPP model and applied 
to it more and more policy fields during the 1990s and 2000s reflected the factors 
which inspired the same development internationally.  Policy makers’ stated rationales 
centred on PPP’s ‘practical’ benefits as a method of increasing public spending but 
without raising up-front costs to government or exchequer borrowing; enabling the 
private sector to take on board some of the risks (and of course profit) associated with 
public infrastructure and service provision and leveraging private companies’ expertise.  
Thus, in addition to critiquing the validity of these claims, academic debate on PPPs has 
focused on locating this policy within the wider neo liberal agenda of rolling back 
government involvement in the economy and privatisation (see: Greeve and Hodge 
(eds) 2013 for a cross-country analysis and Hearne, 2010 for an Irish focussed 
discussion). 
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In the context of redeveloping public housing in Dublin, Redmond and Russell (2008) 
suggest that PPPs’ attractions were amplified by their relevance to other important 
urban and housing policy agendas.  Chief among these was policy makers’ concern to 
create ‘sustainable neighbourhoods’ and view that better urban design (based on 
densification of urban development) and ‘mixing’ of tenures and land uses were key to 
achieving this (Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 2007: 
28).  Furthermore, PPPs complement the thrust of Irish urban policy since the 1980s 
which has relied primarily on encouraging the private sector to refurbish and build 
(privately owned) dwellings in run down urban neighbourhoods.  However, interviews 
with Dublin City Council staff indicate they played a leading role in initiating the PPP 
experiment.  In an interview conducted during the 2004-07 research, a senior Council 
manager claimed that prior to the Fatima Mansions’ redevelopment: “I don't think 
anybody every contemplated that PPPs would be used for the regeneration of social 
housing because it had never been used before”.  It was after the establishment of this 
the Fatima pathfinder project that the housing ministry began to promote this model for 
application elsewhere (Hearne, 2011). 
 
Council staff offered several rationales for taking this initiative.  They repeatedly 
claimed to residents and to the authors that they didn’t “have the money” to pay for 
redevelopment and therefore asked, “What are we going to do? Leave fifty-year old 
housing there and just do patch-up work?”  However, this claim is difficult to square 
with the concurrent expansion in gross Irish government expenditure and public 
housing investment which increased by 61.5 and 74.3 per cent respectively between 
2000 and 2007.  Furthermore, Dublin City Council was the only urban municipality in 
Ireland which used PPPs for public housing redevelopment during this period 
(Government of Ireland, various years).  Council staff also explained, unlike traditional 
government funded redevelopment, that PPP finance enabled them implement the 
redevelopment quickly and provide community facilities at a greater speed. Treadwell 
Shine and Norris (2006) support this rationale as they conclude the separate 
government funding streams for social and physical interventions have impeded the 
implementation of holistic neighbourhood redevelopment and a government review of 
directly exchequer funded redevelopment raises concerns about slow progress 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 2008).   
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In addition to these financial drivers, Dublin City Council’s fondness for PPPs reflected 
its particularly strong record of working with the private sector to regenerate the inner-
city (McGuirk and Maclaran 2001 highlight the ‘entrepreneurial culture’ which 
developed in this municipality during the 1990s) and the viability of PPPs in the Dublin 
context.  The very strong property price appreciation in Inner-Dublin in the early 2000s 
generated significant investor interest, whereas weaker property markets in other Irish 
cities rendered such investment financially unattractive.  Council staff interviewed also 
strongly supported the view that tenure mixing is vital for neighbourhood sustainability 
and identified PPP’s ability to enable tenure mixing as a key benefit of using this model 
to redevelop the case-study neighbourhoods.  However small size these 
neighbourhoods (and the associated concentration of disadvantaged households) and 
their location in mixed income (and increasingly affluent) neighbourhoods indicates 
that the neighbourhood effects thesis is of limited relevance to the Dublin’s inner-city 
and indeed to most poor neighbourhoods in a country such as Ireland where the 
population is small and highly dispersed (Norris 2008 makes this point). 
 
Redevelopment Responses 
 
As mentioned above grass roots responses to the PPP redevelopments varied 
significantly between the neighbourhoods under examination in terms of residents’ 
analyses of these plans, the sophistication of their strategy for conveying these views to 
Dublin City Council, the media and other stakeholders and the duration and intensity of 
their resistance. 
 
The lobbying process was lengthiest in the most troubled case-study neighbourhood – 
Fatima Mansions.  Here campaigning for redevelopment started in the 1980s and the 
related community activity resulted in the establishment of community run addiction, 
childcare and education services.  The staff and volunteers who provided these services 
subsequently formed the core of the PPP redevelopment campaign group in the late 
1990s.  A leader of this campaign interviewed during the 2004-07 research explained 
that their lobbying strategy encompassed:  
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 in-depth and ongoing consultation with residents to clarify their objectives for the 
redevelopment 
 researching the requirements of successful regeneration, training residents’ 
representatives and hiring professional advisors to inform responses to the 
Council’s proposals and securing funding for this 
 publishing written reports which detailed residents’ views and formed a basis for 
negotiations and crucially because the residents’ set out their redevelopment 
proposals first (Eleven Acres, Ten Steps was published in 2000) set the agenda for 
negotiations by forcing the Council to respond to their proposals rather than vice 
versa 
 an extensive media and political lobbying strategy  
 insisting on formal meetings between the Council and residents and the 
establishment of an independent board to oversee the redevelopment 
 
This community leader also argued that this was the most sophisticated of the public 
housing redevelopment campaigns which took place in Dublin at this time and 
consequently, Fatima Mansions’ residents negotiated with Dublin City Council on 
relatively equal terms and achieved the majority of their campaign objectives.  His 
analysis is supported by the fact that this was the only PPP neighbourhood where 
Dublin City Council agreed to legally underpin the independent regeneration board and 
provide a large grant for social regeneration and particularly generous funding to 
enable residents participate in redevelopment negotiations including office space, 
support staff, processional advice and training.  Although this neighbourhood’s 
‘pathfinder’ status may have also encouraged the Council to grant community 
concessions in order to convince other candidates for PPP redevelopment of the merits 
of this model. 
 
The same community leader attributed residents’ ability to mount a campaign of this 
sophistication to its duration, the strength of the local community development project 
and the continuity of the key actors involved.  He argued that due to the lengthy process 
of growing campaigning and community activity, by the 1990s community services in 
Fatima Mansions employed a large number of paid staff who have “built-up great skills” 
and good relationships with Council managers.  In addition, he emphasized the 
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importance of activists’ willingness to devote time and thought to devising a campaign 
strategy: 
… our approach is like two pages of a book.  On the one page you have all 
the day-to-day work you need to do to keep your show on the road, you 
know, your services running… on the other you have the bigger picture, 
your plan for what you want to achieve in the long run.  But you have to 
think about both, that’s the key (interview with Fatima Mansions 
community leader, conducted in 2004-07). 
 
As well as a sophisticated lobbying strategy, the Fatima Mansions’ redevelopment 
campaign was distinguished by activists’ decision to co-operate with the PPP plans, in 
contrast with their neighbours in Dolphin House.  One Fatima Mansions activist 
explained during the 2004-07 research that this stance was politically challenging 
because he and fellow activists were politically left wing and therefore ideologically 
committed to preserving public housing and also because their support for the PPP 
attracted criticism from community activists in other public housing neighbourhoods: 
“Like really to some degree it was very tough because…  Tenants First had been 
established and we were part of that…and there was a bit of a debate, some people were 
saying, well it [the PPP] is not public housing”.   Despite these concerns the interviewee 
explained that Fatima Mansions’ activists concluded that in their case the benefits of the 
PPP outweighed the disadvantages - “from our perspective...my job… is to represent the 
[Fatima Mansions] residents first and foremost, it isn't to represent the interests of the 
world” (interview with Fatima Mansions community activist, conducted in 2004-07).    
In addition, unlike their counterparts in the other case-study neighbourhoods, Fatima 
Mansions’ residents supported the construction of private housing and the removal of 
70 public housing units.  A community worker explained their reasons during the 2004-
07 research: 
Some of the families that were in those 70 [suffered severe social 
problems]…. the projects here and all the services and make it a credible 
impact on the quality of the [remaining] families’ lives now and the jobs 
and opportunities, self-esteem, confidence.  I honestly believe had it been 
220 [resident households] we'd have been struggling [to achieve that]... 
(interview with Fatima Mansions community worker, conducted in  
2004-07). 
 
O’Devaney Gardens residents’ analysis of and response to the PPP proposed for their 
neighbourhood were very different.  A local community worker explained during the 
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2007-09 research that inadequate community structures significantly weakened 
residents’ hands in negotiations with Dublin City Council: 
 
O’Devaney Gardens wasn’t ready for this sort of thing [PPP negotiations] 
at all in regards of community structures. There wasn’t really any proper 
tenants associations, none of that… There was just one development 
worker dealing with the residents… The main problem we have here is 
that we're not highly organised (interview with O’Devaney Gardens 
community worker, conducted in 2007-09). 
 
During the PPP negotiations community structures were further weakened by 
the decanting of a large proportion of dwellings to facilitate their demolition and 
resultant population decline.  In addition, unlike their counterparts in Fatima 
Mansions, O’Devaney Gardens residents decided that were unwilling to accept 
any diminution in public housing numbers (Hearne, 2011).  Despite this situation 
residents felt that they had no option but to co-operate with the PPP 
redevelopment.  One resident explained why during the 2007-09 research: 
 
Residents were saying: ‘can you not just build a housing scheme for 
everyone in O’Devaney? There is enough room.’ Dublin City Council said 
they don’t have the money for that and what you have to understand is if 
we don’t go down this road [PPP], there is no money for O’Devaney. So it 
meant we had no choice – it was a case of the estate gets worse or go for a 
PPP (interview with O’Devaney Gardens resident, conducted in 2007-09). 
 
Residents’ representatives did reach agreement with Dublin City Council that all 
public housing would be replaced in the redeveloped neighbourhood but they 
were informed by the Council that the resultant reduction in private housing and 
therefore the developer’s profits would mean that no cash grant would be 
provided to fund social regeneration.  Furthermore, the Council provided very 
limited funding to support residents’ participation in the negotiation process and 
as the population declined during the decanting process, only a small, 
disempowered, community remained to negotiate with.  Thus, following the 
collapse of the O’Devaney Gardens PPP in 2008 the Council faced limited 
resistance to emptying dwellings and demolishing the neighbourhood (Hearne, 
2011). 
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In contrast, community development and resident structures in Dolphin House were 
strong before the redevelopment discussions commenced and residents here decided to 
oppose both the reduction in public housing numbers and (initially at least) the PPP 
redevelopment proposals.  Like Fatima Mansions, several community run-social 
services were established in Dolphin House during the 1980s and 1990s and their staff 
and volunteers formed the core of the redevelopment campaign.  Dublin City Council 
staff insisted that no funding would be provided to support community consultation 
prior to Dolphin House residents’ representatives agreeing to support the PPP and that 
this model was the only redevelopment option available.  However, Dolphin House 
residents continued to insist that other redevelopment options be examined and that no 
dwelling would be emptied prior to the Council agreeing redevelopment plans with 
residents.  These stances were informed by O’Devaneny Gardens residents’ negative 
experiences of decanting of dwellings (revealed following a visit by Dolphin House 
residents in 2006) and by the Tenants First (2009: 5) campaign which argued that the 
Council’s real agenda in promoting PPPs was to: 
 
allow estates to deteriorate so people had no choice to leave so that local 
authorities can get access to prime development that these estates are 
located on to sell for private development and the issue of these ‘problem’ 
estates is permanently removed (Tenants First, 2009). 
 
Dolphin House residents’ strategy was high risk and in the short term just appeared to 
delay badly needed redevelopment but it paid dividends in the long term.  In 2007 the 
Council capitulated to some residents’ demands for grant aid to community 
consultation, this investment further strengthened community structures which had not 
been undermined by decanting of residents.  When the PPP schemes proposed for five 
neighbourhoods collapsed the following year, Dublin City Council was forced to treat 
Dolphin House residents differently from their counterparts in O’Devaney Gardens 
because the former neighbourhood contained a large, cohesive population which had 
strong campaigning skills and therefore could not be ignored.  When the Council still 
refused to directly fund redevelopment in 2008, the Dolphin House residents decided to 
change their campaign focus and strategy.  They bypassed the municipality and 
established the human rights campaign described above which focussed on national and 
international ‘duty bearers’, such as the housing ministry and the Irish and European 
human rights authorities (Hearne and Kenna, 2014).  Following this pioneering 
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campaign, residents achieved their goals and Dublin City Council announced that public 
funds would be provided to redevelop Dolphin House. 
 
Redevelopment Outcomes 
 
The outcomes of the redevelopment and resistance processes described above varied 
significantly between the case-study neighbourhoods.  Fatima Mansions was 
demolished and rebuilt between 2004 and 2006 and the social regeneration project 
completed five years later.  The consensus among the Council staff and residents 
interviewed by the authors is that this redevelopment has been largely but not entirely 
successful.  The rebuilt public housing is of very high quality and the social regeneration 
has had a positive impact but poverty and hard drug dealing remain problematic and 
some new private dwellings failed to sell following the Irish property market collapse 
and were bought by a housing association (i.e. a non-profit sector social housing 
provider) instead.  Therefore, the tenure mixing elements of the redevelopment was 
been only partially successful and ironically social housing numbers remain at 1990s 
levels.  The state funded redevelopment of Dolphin House was about to commence at 
the time of writing and the community remains resilient.  In contrast the unsuccessful 
efforts to employ a PPP to redevelop O’Devaney Gardens devastated this community 
and led ultimately to its break-up.  By 2008, 100 of the 278 dwellings in the 
neighbourhood had been decanted and a resident interviewed during the 2007-09 
research predicted that this would set off a spiral of decline: 
 
I am worried about the displacement of the community. By giving people 
who want to move off the site attractive housing elsewhere… the more 
stable, less vulnerable, will move away and those left are the ones with 
most difficulties (interview with O’Devaney Gardens community worker, 
conducted in 2007-09). 
 
Unfortunately this prediction proved correct and the vacant apartment blocks attracted 
significant anti-social behaviour.  Not surprisingly this increased residents’ willingness 
to move out of the estate and by 2014 only 44 households remain occupied. 
 
 
18 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has examined residents’ varying responses to proposals to redevelop three 
public housing neighbourhoods in Dublin using PPPs and the contrasting outcomes 
their resistance achieved. In two of these neighbourhoods, residents’ representative 
structures and community cohesion were strong and lobbying strategies sophisticated, 
but while one co-operated with the PPP proposal, the other campaigned against it.  
Despite their different analysis of the redevelopment proposals, residents of both 
neighbourhoods achieved most of their campaigning objectives and both communities 
remain strong and successful.  In contrast, community structures in the other case-study 
neighbourhood were weak and residents were made to feel that they had no option but 
to co-operate with the PPP.  Furthermore, the decanting of residents to free up space to 
build private housing led to the devastation of this community.  The neighbourhood was 
almost vacant at the time of writing and earmarked for demolition. 
 
These neighbourhoods highlight by the key role in which variations in the intensity and 
sophistication of community agitation, lobbying and resistance played in shaping their 
landlord’s redevelopment plans.  In two of the three cases, the well organised 
communities proved very influential which reveals that the power and agency of 
residents of working class neighbourhoods is incorrectly ignored or underestimated in 
much of the literature on urban social movements and public housing privatisation. It 
also points to an undervaluing of the strengths of such working class, deprived, public 
housing communities and the importance of their local networks of solidarity and 
community services in reproducing cohesive and resilience communities among 
researchers and policy makers. The cases of Fatima Mansions and Dolphin House 
demonstrate that contrary to the dominant ‘post-political’ consensus, resistance is not 
futile. In the right circumstances and with the right strategy and supports, 
disadvantaged urban communities can play a central role in shaping the environments 
in which they live. 
At the same time, the other neighbourhood examined here, O’Devaney Gardens 
highlights the vulnerability of disadvantaged communities in the face of powerful forces 
and potential for redevelopment to increase rather than diminish this vulnerability.  
This case challenges policy makers and researchers to ask ‘redevelopment for whom?' It 
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illustrates how public housing redevelopment programmes often primarily reflect the 
interests of governments, landlords and (in the case of PPPs), business, rather than 
those of residents and communities of target neighbourhoods.  It also raises questions 
about the centrality of development based on social ‘mixing’ gentrification, property 
redevelopment and demolition and rebuilding in Irish public housing regeneration 
policy.  Treadwell Shine and Norris (2006) and Hearne (2011) argue that such 
intervention is overused and offered as the solution to public housing neighbourhoods’ 
problems irrespective of what is their cause.  The recent history of O’Devaney Gardens 
reveals the extent to which these policies rely on a destruction of communities through 
dislocation, with the result that the community which campaigns for development does 
not remain in situ to enjoy its benefits. 
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